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Abstract
This paper focuses on the dynamic capital structure of ¯rms: Why ¯rms choose
very di®erent capital structure in di®erent stages of their life-cycles? In a model of
optimal ¯nancial contracting, we investigate whether subsequent ¯nancing decisions
of ¯rms are a®ected by the outcome of previous ¯nancing decisions. We ¯nd that the
initial and subsequent ¯nancing decisions of the same ¯rm may lead to di®erent security
choices. The ¯rms' ¯nancing decisions will di®er in two respect. First, there will be
equilibrium contracts that investors would reject for some small ¯rm, but accept them
for an otherwise identical large ¯rm (i.e. when the two ¯rms have identical projects).
Secondly, even the set of the equilibrium ¯nancial contracts di®ers in di®erent stages of
the ¯rm's lifecycle: some contracts which are never sustainable as an initial contract for
a small ¯rm become sustainable for large ¯rms. The reason is the stage-dependency of
the control rights of subsequent claimholders: in addition to their own rights, holders
of subsequent security issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to enforce
their claims. Whether or not they can do so, depends on the priority structure of the
claims.
Consistent with empirical evidence, our theory implies a life-cycle pattern of ¯-
nancing: ¯rms will issue outside equity, short-term debt or convertible debt ¯rst, then
use their retained earnings, issue longer-term debt, or outside equity to satisfy sub-
sequent ¯nancing needs. A novel result of our analysis is that, despite the presence
of severe market imperfections, the Modigliani-Miller indi®erence result between debt
and equity does hold for large ¯rms in our model, but at the same time, it fails to hold
for small ¯rms. The intuition is again the interaction between the control rights of
subsequent claimholders. Since the control rights of previous securityholders represent
an externality for subsequent claimholders, the marginal decision of which security to
issue next becomes irrelevant once a ¯rm has su±cient contractual complexity in place.
Keywords: security design, nonveri¯ability of cash °ows, managerial moral hazard,
control rights, maturity, managerial dismissal, asset liquidation, capital structure.
JEL Classi¯cation: G34, L14
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1 Introduction
In practice the ¯nancial structures of small entrepreneurial ¯rms are typically very di®erent
from those of large, ongoing ¯rms. Small entrepreneurial ¯rms use convertible debt, private
equity and short-term bank loans, whereas larger, ongoing companies typically issue outside
equity and public debt. Interestingly, not only the types of the contracts di®er for companies
in di®erent stages of their life-cycles but there are also signi¯cant di®erences in the terms
(control rights and maturities) of the contracts even within the same class (debt or equity)
(See for example Kaplan and StrÄomberg (1999)).
While the practice is well-documented, there is very little theory to explain the di®erences
in the ¯nancing choices of ¯rms and in the design of ¯nancial contracts in di®erent stages
of the ¯rms' life cycles. Among the most challenging questions the theory of ¯nancial con-
tracting faces are: Why are small entrepreneurial ¯rms so di®erent from more established,
larger ¯rms? Why do ¯rms have very di®erent ¯nancial structures in di®erent stages of their
life-cycles? Why are small, entrepreneurial ¯rms contractually more risky investments than
more established, ongoing ¯rms?
The reason why no such investigation has been carried out earlier is that until re-
cently most of the ¯nancial contracting literature focused almost exclusively on small en-
trepreneurial ¯rms and ignored the ¯nancing decisions of larger, ongoing ¯rms. Models that
were developed for investigating the ¯nancing choices of entrepreneurs were then used to
make predictions about the capital structure decisions of larger, established companies.1
1Zwiebel (1996), Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Fluck (1999a) are exceptions. In Zwiebel's model
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With this perspective corporate ¯nance theory was unable to shed light on how ¯rms in
various stages of their life-cycle di®er in the ¯nancing choices they make.2
We model the capital structure decisions of the startup and the ongoing ¯rm as di®erent
stages of the sequential decision-making process. The ¯rst stage is the ¯nancing of the
when the manager chooses the ¯rm's capital structure he takes into account the impact the ¯rm's capital
structure will have on his incentives and on his ability to stay with the ¯rm in the future. Zwiebel shows
that issuing debt commits the manager to make the right investment in the future and thereby enables him
to avoid the threat of takeover. Bolton and von Thadden develop a model of a large ¯rm to compare the
liquidity bene¯ts obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the bene¯ts of e±cient management
control achieved by some degree of ownership concentration. In Fluck's model of entrenched management
and dispersed outside equity management chooses the distribution of equity ownership so as to maximize
private bene¯ts against the risk of potential control challenges. Our paper is related to Zwiebel (1996),
Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Fluck (1999a), since these papers also develop models of a large ¯rm
that are distinct from the traditional founder-entrepreneur model of a small ¯rm. However, neither of these
articles studies the ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms in di®erent stages of their life-cycles, that is the focus of our
model.
2Diamond (1991) presents a model in which ¯rms access di®erent sources of ¯nancing as they develop
reputation. Banks provide screening and monitoring of companies. Firms use bank ¯nancing in the early
stages of their life-cycle or after a period of distress. As they develop a good reputation, companies can access
cheaper form of ¯nancing such as public debt. Our paper is closest in spirit to Diamond (1991). Unlike in
Diamond's model, the friction between the ¯rm and ¯nancier in our model is not asymmetric information
but the incompleteness of ¯nancial contracts. A further di®erence between the two papers is their focus:
Whereas Diamond's concentrates on the choice of between two alternatives, bank debt and public debt, our
focus is on the sequential ¯nancing decisions between various classes of debt and outside equity and on the
interaction between equity and debt holders.
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¯rm's initial project (we call it "small ¯rm"), the second stage is the ¯nancing of the ¯rm's
expansion project (we call it "large ¯rm"). We model the small ¯rm as an entrepreneur
seeking ¯nancing for his initial project. Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1989), we assume that the entrepreneur can divert or manipulate the ¯rm's cash °ows
and it is prohibitively costly to prove any managerial wrongdoing for a third party such as
a court, hence contracts can not be written on cash °ows because courts cannot verify their
realizations. Our model of the large ¯rm is an enterprise which successfully operates and
¯nances its initial project and seeks ¯nancing for an expansion project.
In this setting, we ¯nd that the initial and the subsequent ¯nancing decisions of the same
¯rm may lead to di®erent security choices. The ¯rms' ¯nancing decisions will di®er in two
respect. First, there will be equilibrium contracts that investors would reject for some small
¯rm, but accept them for an otherwise identical large ¯rm (i.e. when the two ¯rms have
identical projects). The reason is the stage-dependency of the control rights of subsequent
claim holders: in addition to their own rights, holders of subsequent security issues may also
rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to enforce their claims. As a consequence, the pro¯tability
threshold that subsequent claim holders require for ¯nancing a project in a large ¯rm will
be lower than the threshold for ¯nancing the same project in a small ¯rm. This enables the
large ¯rm to issue debt when a small ¯rm with an identical project cannot.
Secondly, even the set of equilibrium ¯nancial contracts di®ers in di®erent stages of the
¯rm's life cycle. In particular, some contracts that are never sustainable as an initial contract
for a small ¯rm become sustainable for a large ¯rm. If investors are willing to write a ¯nancial
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contract for a small ¯rm, they are always willing to write the same contract for a large ¯rm
but not vice versa: there are contracts that are only available for large ¯rms. Again, the
intuition lies in the interaction between the control rights of existing and subsequent claim
holders. Since holders of subsequent security issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing
investors to enforce their claims, they are willing to enter into contracts that they would
have otherwise rejected as an initial contract.
Since the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller [M&M] (1958), a vast literature3 has
developed to investigate the robustness of their result about investors' indi®erence between
debt and equity. These articles introduced taxes, asymmetric information, agency problems
and incomplete contracting into the M&M framework. With the exception of Dybvig and
Zender (1986),4 the literature concluded that the Modigliani-Miller proposition fails to hold
in the presence of market imperfections. A novel result of our analysis is that for a wide range
of ¯rms the M&M proposition is fairly robust to a particular class of market imperfections,
contractual incompleteness. In our model, despite their inability to write complete ¯nancial
contracts, investors are indi®erent between debt and equity in large ¯rms, but they strongly
prefer one over the other in small ¯rms. The intutition is again the interaction between
the control rights of subsequent claimholders: Since the control rights of previous security
3See Harris and Raviv (1991, 1992), Hart (1995) and Allen and Winton (1997) for comprehensive surveys
of this literature.
4Dybvig and Zender shows that the M&M proposition is valid in a large class of models with asymmetric
information. The authors' proof relies on the assumption that managerial compensation is chosen optimally.
Our paper has a lot in common with Dybvig and Zender (1986) even though the market imperfection in our
model is not asymmetric information but incompleteness of ¯nancial contracts.
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holders represent an externality for subsequent claim holders, the marginal decision of which
security to issue next becomes irrelevant once a ¯rm has su±cient contractual complexity in
place.5
Since the di®erent contracts require di®erent pro¯tability thresholds for the ¯nancing of
an initial project, our theory also implies a life-cycle pattern of ¯rm ¯nancing: ¯rms will issue
outside equity, or convertible debt ¯rst, then use their retained earnings, and ¯nally issue
long-term debt or outside equity to satisfy their subsequent ¯nancing needs. Interestingly,
this pattern di®ers from the one implied by Myers's (1984) pecking order theory of ¯nance
in one important aspect: the initial ¯nancing choice of the ¯rm. Myers predicts that ¯rms
will issue debt ¯rst and outside equity only later, whereas our theory suggests that the ¯rm's
¯rst outside equity issue will precede its ¯rst public debt issue.6 Carey et al. (1993) and
5It is worth to mention that the indi®erence result of Dybvig and Zender fails to hold if equity holders are
granted the unconditional right to dismiss management. Since it was shown in Fluck (1998) that when the
entrepreneur can divert or manipulate the ¯rm's cash °ows and when it is prohibitively costly to prove any
managerial wrongdoing for a third party such as a court, then outside equity is sustainable only if investors
are granted unconditional rights with inde¯nite maturity, the unconditional right to dismiss management is
a fundamental feature of our model of equity. Nevertheless, in our model investors are indi®erent between
debt and equity in large ¯rms.
6This implication of our theory on the timing of debt and equity issues in small ¯rms is related to Garmaise
(1998) and Habib and Johnsen (1998). Garmaise develops a theory of small ¯rms in which investors are better
informed about the prospects of the entrepreneur's project than the entrepreneur. Given this informational
asymmetry, small ¯rms prefer to issue equity over debt. Habib and Johnsen shows that if investors are
more informed about the primary use of the ¯rm's assets than the entrepreneur, then the ¯rm will sell them
equity and alternatively, if investors are more informed about the secondary use of the ¯rm's assets, then
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Helwege and Liang (1996) presents evidence that small ¯rms frequently issue outside equity
before they issue debt.
Our theory has interesting implications about managerial consumption of perks. Even
though we allow the manager to divert or manipulate the ¯rm's cash °ows and it is pro-
hibitively costly to prove any managerial wrongdoing for a third party such as a court, the
manager's appropriation of private bene¯ts is not a signi¯cant problem in equilibrium except
for ¯rms in economic distress.7 Consistent with Bolton and von Thadden (1998), our model
further predicts that managerial consumption of perks is even less of a concern in large ¯rms
than it is in small ¯rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies the
initial ¯nancing of ¯rms. Section 4 investigates the subsequent ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms.
Section 5 present the implications of the model for a life-cycle theory of ¯rm ¯nance. Section
6 extends the model to incorporate covenant debt, Section 7 to incorporate dispersed outside
equity. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider two ¯rms: a small, start-up ¯rm ("small ¯rm") and a larger, established ¯rm
("large ¯rm"). Our small ¯rm is an entrepreneurial enterprise. We model it as a risk-neutral
the ¯rm will issue debt. Unlike our paper, neither of these articles develop a theory on the sequencing of
¯rm ¯nancing.
7This result is consistent with Leland (1999) and Fluck (1999) who ¯nd that managerial asset substitution
only becomes a serious problem when ¯rms are in distress.
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entrepreneur who has no wealth and who seeks ¯nancing for a project from risk-neutral
investors. Our large ¯rm is an enterprise that successfully operates and ¯nances its ¯rst
project and seeks ¯nancing for an expansion project.
We assume that the ¯rm's initial project and the expansion project are otherwise identi-
cal. We do so to make our point more transparent, i.e. even in the case of identical projects,
subsequent ¯nancing decisions may lead to di®erent security choices.
The projects yield periodic operating cash °ows, ~v: The cash °ow, ~v; is an i.i.d. random
variable that takes on the values v + x > 0 and v ¡ x > 0 with equal probabilities. Each
project requires an investment outlay, I; and involves the operation of an equipment with
economic life of two periods. Both the investors and the entrepreneur use the same positive
discount factor, ±; to value future payo®s.
Each period the manager can divert the cash °ows. Each period, investors and manage-
ment both learn the true realization of the cash °ows. However, the true realization of the
cash °ows is assumed to be nonveri¯able by a third party such as a court. Hence contracts
written on cash °ows are prohibitively costly to verify in court (Grossman and Hart (1986)).
The entrepreneur-manager can repeat the projects over and over again. As long as a
project continues, the entrepreneur-manager can seek external ¯nancing for the replacement
of the physical assets at the beginning of each cycle, or he can renew the equipment each
period by retaining some of the earnings, a. If a is spent at time 1 and time 2, then further
investment of I in period 2 can be avoided. We assume that each investment policy is
feasible, that is, v¡ x ¸ a: We also assume that these investment policies are equally costly
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to implement, that is, I = a± + a: Notice that the liquidation values of the assets depend on
which investment policy the entrepreneur-manager adopts.
If the equipment is replaced every other period, then it depreciates over time and its liq-
uidation value varies from period to period. The equipment has a positive liquidation value,
L1 < ±I; if investors choose to liquidate the ¯rm's assets immediately after the investment
is sunk. Alternatively, if investors choose to liquidate the assets immediately following the
realization of period 1 cash °ows, then the equipment has a liquidation value, L2 < L1: These
liquidation values are distributed at time 1 and time 2, respectively. The salvage value of
the equipment at the end of its operation is zero.
Alternatively, if the equipment is renewed period after period, its liquidation value is
equal to L1 across periods. The equipment can be periodically renewed if all cash °ow
realizations of the project exceed the cost of the renewal, that is, if v ¡ x ¸ a:
Investors know whether or not the equipment has been renewed. This managerial invest-
ment policy is also nonveri¯able for a third party, such as a court, unless the company is
liquidated and the physical assets are foreclosed. As a general principle, in this model only
receipts of payments are veri¯able. We assume that the true realization of all other ¯nancial
and accounting variables are prohibitively costly to verify.
The entrepreneur can seek debt or equity ¯nancing from investors. In our modeling of
these ¯nancial contracts we follow Fluck (1998). In these ¯nancing arrangements investors
o®er I; the investment outlay to the entrepreneur-manager in exchange of future payments
and contingent or unconditional control rights. Investors may be granted the right to liqui-
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date the assets, or the right to dismiss management.
When no control challenge is initiated, the manager decides on the investment policy and
then makes payments to investors. Investors receive pt; the payment on which the manager
has decided, and the manager receives vt ¡ at ¡ pt or vt ¡ pt; depending on his investment
policy. We denote the expected payment investors receive by p; the equilibrium payment in
the high state by pv+x and the equilibrium payment in the low state by pv¡x. We denote the
managerial equilibrium payo® vt ¡ at ¡ pt by Mv+x and Mv¡x; respectively.
In the event of liquidation, the manager receives no payo® and investors receive the
liquidation value of the physical assets. In the event of a dismissal, a new manager takes
charge and decides on the payments and the investment policy. The former manager receives
no payo®, and the investors bear c; the cost associated with replacing the manager.
3 The small ¯rm
There are several equilibrium ¯nancial contracts that can be issued for the ¯nancing of small
¯rms. Among the sustainable contracts those that do not involve ine±cient liquidation
(dismissal) in equilibrium are Pareto-optimal. These contracts impose zero veri¯cation cost
on the parties, they involve no deadweight loss in equilibrium and the payo® of one party
(investors or management) can be improved only at the expense of the other party.
In this section, we will study three contracts for the ¯nancing of small entrepreneurial
¯rms. Three is the minimal number needed to establish that (i) for the ¯nancing of large ¯rms
investors require lower pro¯tability thresholds; and (ii) for large ¯rms the set of sustainable
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¯nancial contracts is larger than it is for small ¯rms. We will show that (1) large ¯rms can
sustain all three contracts as equilibrium contracts even though one of these contracts is
never an equilibrium contract for small ¯rms; and (2) if a large ¯rm can issue one contract,
it can also issue the other two, even though for some small ¯rms only one of these contracts
is accessible.
3.1 Outside Equity
We model outside equity as a contract that promises investors a claim to the ¯rm's cash
°ows, the unconditional right to dismiss management or to liquidate the ¯rm's physical
assets and inde¯nite maturity.8 The strategy-pair for the equity holders and the manager
IE;ME that constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium within this contract are shown below.
For the equity holders: Equity holders do not replace the manager at ¯rst and until the
manager paid equilibrium dividends and properly maintained the ¯rm's assets each period.
If there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then they replace the manager next period.
For the (new) manager: The manager pays equilibrium dividends and maintains the
¯rm's assets each period. If there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then he will divert
the cash °ows for ever. 2
8Fluck (1998) showed that the only outside equity that can be sustained is of unlimited life. Her result
follows from the inability of ¯nitely-lived investment opportunities to provide the manager with an incentive
not to consume vt every period. Put simply, in the last period of the equity's life, the manager consumes
vt: Firing is not a credible threat since ¯ring is costly to the equity and the new manager has the same
incentives as the old manager. Since the manager knows she consumes vt in the last period in the next to
last period the manager can consume all of vt since ¯ring again is not a credible threat.
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Investors are willing to hold outside equity if and only if (i) they can recover the outlay;
and (ii) the present value of the stream of the managerial incentive payments exceeds any
possible cash °ow realizations (if it were not the case then the manager would prefer to take
the cash °ows and face dismissal). Formally,
±p
1¡ ± ¸ I: (1)
Mv+x + ±
v ¡ p¡ a
1¡ ± ¸ v + x; (2)
Mv¡x + ±
v ¡ p¡ a
1¡ ± ¸ v ¡ x: (3)
The rest of the incentive compatibility conditions are shown in Appendix A1. For c < a;
these incentive compatibility conditions are implied by (1), (2) and (3).
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3.2 Debt contract with the right to dismiss management
In this section we model debt as a security that promises investors a ¯xed payment and
grants them the right to dismiss management and to take over the ¯rm as a going concern or
to extend the maturity of the debt in the event of a default. As shown in Fluck (1999b), such
a contract provides the ¯rm's manager with the proper incentives for the timely renewal of
the ¯rm's assets, and as a consequence, it can be sustained with maturity shorter or longer
than the life of the ¯rm's physical assets.
When investors have the contingent right to dismiss management and take over the ¯rm
as a going concern, then the following strategy-pair ILT ;MLT constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
For the debt holders: (i) The debt holders replace the manager and take over the ¯rm in
a strategic default (when the manager could make the payment but would rather default)
in period t and forgive him and extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default (when
the manager cannot make the payment) in period t; (ii) If the manager has strategically
defaulted in period t but he has not been dismissed in this period and/or the ¯rm has not
been taken over, then the debt holders will dismiss him and will take over the ¯rm next
period regardless of the payment made; (iii) If the manager was dismissed in a liquidity
default in period t or the ¯rm has been taken over, then the debt holders will dismiss the
new manager and will take over the ¯rm next period; (iv) If the debt holders have dismissed
the manager and have taken over the ¯rm in a liquidity default in period t, then they will
replace the manager and will take over the ¯rm in any strategic default thereafter and will
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forgive him and extend the maturity of the debt in any liquidity default thereafter; (v) If
there is a liquidity default in period t and investors forgive but do not extend the maturity
of the debt, then investors will replace the manager and take over the ¯rm in the event of
a strategic default in any period thereafter and forgive him and extend the maturity of the
debt in the event of a liquidity default in any period thereafter.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) If a (new) manager has not strategically
defaulted until period t, then he will not default in period t; (b) if the manager ¯nds himself
on the job immediately following a strategic default in period t, then he will continue to
divert the cash °ows thereafter; (c) If the manager has been replaced following a default
in period t but the company has not been taken over by the debt holders, then the new
manager will divert the cash °ows each period thereafter; (d) If the manager has been
replaced immediately following a default in period t and the company has been taken over
by the debt holders, then the new manager will not strategically default in the following
period. 2
The potential debt holders are willing to provide ¯nancing if (i) they can recover the
outlay; and (ii) the present value of all future managerial incentive payments exceed any
possible cash °ow realizations (otherwise the manager would prefer to take the cash °ows
and face dismissal). Formally, 8 0 · ¿ < T
p
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ ¸ I; (4)
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Mv+x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v + x; (5)
and
Mv¡x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v ¡ x: (6)
where M1 is the period-(T+1) expected value of the manager's future payo®s once the
contract has expired.
There are two additional incentive compatibility conditions required here. Since the debt
holders can only act if the manager has failed to make the payment, a manager planning
a strategic default can also devise a two-step default strategy: In the ¯rst period he would
make the contractual payment but would milk the assets (i.e. divert a). Debt holders cannot
intervene because their right is contingent on default. Then, in the second period he would
divert all the cash °ows and default on the contractual payment.
Thus, for the manager to comply with the contract it must be the case that the present
value of all future managerial incentive payments also exceed a+ ±v; the payo® the manager
can guarantee himself from the two-step default strategy. Formally,
Mv+x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ a+ ±v; (7)
Mv¡x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ a+ ±v: (8)
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The remaining incentive compatibility conditions associated with the equilibrium strate-
gies are presented in Appendix A2.
3.3 Short-term debt contract with liquidation rights
Alternatively, the manager can also promise investors a ¯xed payment and the right to
renegotiate the debt and to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets in default. This contract was
introduced in Hart and Moore (1989).
The authors demonstrated that the maximum the manager can be induced to pay in this
contract is the smaller of the period 1 and the period 2 cash °ows in present value terms.
In period 1 the entrepreneur cannot pay more than the current cash °ows (liquidity default)
and will not pay more than his valuation of the cash °ows in period 2 (strategic default).
Thus, the entrepreneur may default when realized cash °ows are low and he is unable to
make the payment. He may also default when current cash °ows are high and future cash
°ows are low. In this case he could pay but he would rather default.
Since the debt holders can only assure a payment that is the smaller of (i) the present
value of the future cash °ows for the entrepreneur and (ii) the current cash °ows plus the
maximal amount that can be raised by liquidating the ¯rm's physical assets so that the cash
°ows from the remaining assets make the entrepreneur-manager just indi®erent to transfer
the current cash °ows as payment, the debt-¯nancing condition will take the following form:
±E(min
½
±~v2;max
½
~v1; ~v1 +
µ
1¡ ~v1
±~v2
±L2
¶¾¾
) ¸ I: (9)
This inequality places an upper bound on the variability of the project's cash °ows.
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Investors are willing to write such a contract only if x, the variability of the project's cash
°ows does not exceed xd(v; I; L2; ±); the value of x that solves (9) for equality.
In a two-period model, Hart and Moore (1989) showed that this contract can only be writ-
ten for one period and that two-period debt contracts are not sustainable. This is because
by the end of period 2 the ¯rm's assets become worthless for both the entrepreneur and the
investors. Since the investors cannot stop the entrepreneur to start a new ¯rm and/or can-
not seize the entrepreneur's future investment opportunities (because of the entrepreneur's
limited liability), liquidation is no longer a threat when the assets are fully depreciated and
the entrepreneur will not make any payment to the investors in period 2.9
Fluck (1998) generalized the above discussed result for the case when the ¯rm's growth
opportunities have inde¯nite life. She shows that when investors are promised a ¯xed pay-
ment and the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets in default, then in longer term debt
contracts the entrepreneur can bene¯t from skipping the investment and defaulting when
the ¯rm's assets are fully depreciated and the liquidation rights are worthless.
9Similar conclusion was reached in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). In their model of two period projects,
the projects require new outlay each period. The only right the investors have is to deny funding for the
entrepreneur's next project. Since in the second period the projects will be over and the investors cannot
enforce any payment from the managers, at the end of period 1 no investor would provide new funding
for any period-2 project. In equilibrium the investors and the entrepreneur agree to a two-period contract
in which the investors automatically provide the entrepreneur with new funds in the second period (even
though it is not subgame perfect for them to do so) unless default occurs in the ¯rst period. This contract
will induce the entrepreneur to make payment at the end of the ¯rst period but he will always default in the
second period.
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To illustrate that the manager can indeed bene¯t from breaching any contract with
maturity T ¸ 2 and can raise ¯nancing for a new ¯rm following the liquidation of the assets
of his old enterprise, consider a debt contract with maturity T > 2: Such a contract requires
the periodic renewal of the ¯rm's assets. First consider the marginal project with respect to
this contract, one that is just able to provide the managerial incentive payments in addition
to returning the outlay and providing for the renewal of the assets.
A necessary condition for the manager to comply with the contract is that there exist
(Mv¡x;Mv+x) such that
Mv¡x + ±
M
(1¡ ±) ¸ v ¡ x; (10)
Mv+x + ±
M
(1¡ ±) ¸ v + x: (11)
A necessary condition for this marginal project to meet debt payments is
I ·
TX
t=1
±tp+ ±T I: (12)
The ¯rst term on the right side is the sum of the payments to investors that can be met
in any period. The second term is the extra payment (the equivalent of the depreciation
account) that can be made during the last cycle when the need for internal ¯nancing is over.
Reorganizing this condition, we get
I · ±p
1¡ ± (13)
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that will hold as equality for our marginal project. Notice that (13) is the equivalent of (1).
Consequently, (1), (10) and (11) are necessary conditions to raise any (o®-equilibrium)
debt with maturity T > 2 for our marginal project. They are also su±cient conditions to
raise outside equity for the marginal project. Thus, the entrepreneur-manager can always
guarantee outside equity ¯nancing for his marginal project following a default on a debt
contract with maturity T > 2: Obviously, any project that is more pro¯table than the
marginal project is also able to raise outside equity. Consequently, the entrepreneur-manager
can always bene¯t from defaulting on a debt contract with maturity T > 2 in period 2,
starting a new ¯rm and ¯nancing it with outside equity.
3.4 Pro¯tability constraints:
Whenever L2 < v ¡ x; then (9) implies (1), (2) and (3). In other words, if a project can
raise short-term debt by o®ering investors the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets
then it can also raise outside equity but not vice versa. It follows from Section 3.3 that if
either (7) or (8) fails to hold then a small ¯rm cannot raise debt by granting investors the
right to dismiss management and to take over the ¯rm as a going concern or to extend the
maturity of the debt but it may still be able to raise outside equity.
From now on we will assume that the project's cash °ows satisfy (1), (2) and (3) but fail
(9) and either (7) or (8). Under these conditions a small ¯rm cannot raise debt but it can
issue outside equity to ¯nance its project. The rest of the paper will focus on the ¯nancing
choice of large ¯rms whose initial project is ¯nanced by outside equity.
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4 Large ¯rm
Recall that in our model the large ¯rm's expansion project is identical to the small ¯rm's
initial project. Thus, when starting the new project, the ¯rm doubles its existing operation.
We will show that this second project can be ¯nanced by debt even if the ¯rm could not
raise debt ¯nancing for its initial project.
4.1 The pro¯tability threshold for ¯nancing the large ¯rm's expansion project
Recall from our earlier discussion on small ¯rm ¯nancing in Section 3.2 that when the
¯rm is ¯nanced by long-term debt, the manager of a small ¯rm has access to more pro¯table
default strategies than when the ¯rm is ¯nanced by equity. Therefore, long-term debt con-
tracts must o®er the manager substantially higher incentive payments to comply with the
contract than equity. As a consequence, investors will only ¯nance the project if (7) and (8)
also holds in addition to (1), (2) and (3).
Interestingly, however, this conclusion does not necessarily carry over to large ¯rms. The
reasoning is as follows. In case of a large ¯rm the ¯rm already successfully operates and
¯nances one project. Outside equity holders are willing to supply the initial ¯nancing for
the ¯rm's original project, since their threat of dismissal provides the manager with su±cient
incentives to comply with the contract and to properly maintain project 1's assets. When
the ¯rm expands and debt is issued to ¯nance the new project, then the potential debt
holders will take into consideration the managerial incentives provided by outside equity.
In particular, if holders of a subsequent debt issue can count on existing equity holders
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to dismiss the entrepreneur-manager whenever he fails to renew project 2's assets, then a
strategic default in the large company will not yield the manager more than the current cash
°ows of the ¯rm and hence the debt holders would be willing to ¯nance the ¯rm's expansion
project even if (7) and (8) fail to hold.
Whether or not debt holders can rely on equity holders to enforce their claim depends on
the priority of their claims. If debt holders can take over the operation of both projects (up
to the value of their claim), then the equity holders will guard the debt holders' investment,
because their interests will coincide in equilibrium. Equity holders would do so even if they
do not expect any cash °ows from the second project (i.e. even if all cash °ows above the
debt payments and depreciation accrue to the manager as private bene¯ts) because otherwise
they will lose their dividends from project 1.
Alternatively, if the debt holders can take over the second project only (project ¯nance)10
and the equity holders do not expect any dividends from the second project (since all cash
°ows above the debt payments and depreciation accrue to the manager as private bene¯ts),
then the debt holders cannot rely on the equity holders to protect their interest. In the latter
case the manager must be given higher incentive payments to comply with the contract and to
properly maintain the ¯rm's assets. Hence the debt holders will refuse to write debt contracts
10In a model of complete ¯nancial contracts Berkovitch and Kim (1990) shows that project ¯nance is
optimal in reducing managerial incentives for under- and overinvestment. In our model of incomplete ¯nancial
contracting incentives for managerial overinvestments are not present. Here granting debt seniority can
achieve more than project ¯nance can: issuing senior debt enables large ¯rms to raise debt ¯nancing for
projects that small ¯rms cannot.
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for a large ¯rm whenever they would do so for a small ¯rm. Proposition 1 summarizes the
conditions under which large ¯rms can more frequently issue debt than small ¯rms.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a ¯rm successfully operates one project and ¯nances it by out-
side equity. Suppose furthermore that the ¯rm seeks to ¯nance its second project by issuing
debt. Then, if the debt holders are granted the right to dismiss the manager and take over the
¯rm (the operation of both project 1 and project 2 up to the value of their claim) as a going
concern in default, then they would be willing to hold debt whenever c < a and (1), (2) and
(3) hold. Alternatively, if the debt holders are granted only the right to take over project 2
as a going concern in default and if equity holders do not expect any cash °ows from project
2 in equilibrium (i.e. all cash °ows above the debt payments and depreciation accrue to the
manager), then the entrepreneur-manager can not raise debt unless conditions (7) and (8)
hold.
The corresponding equilibrium strategies can be obtained by combining IE; ILT ;ME and
MLT . In this equilibrium the equity holders will dismiss the manager if the manager has
failed to maintain project 2's assets. The debtholders's action will depend on whether or
not the equityholders dismissed the manager for failing to maintain the ¯rm's assets prior
to default. In particular, the debt holders' equilibrium strategy will specify to forgive and
extend the maturity of the debt in a default that resulted from the manager's failure to
maintain the ¯rm's assets if the manager has been dismissed by the equity holders by the
time default has taken place. In contrast the debt holders' equilibrium strategy will specify
to dismiss the manager and to take over the ¯rm as a going concern had the manager stayed
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on. Formally,
For the equity holders: Equity holders do not replace the manager at ¯rst and until the
manager paid equilibrium dividends and properly maintained the ¯rm's assets each period.
If there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then they replace the manager next period.
For the debt holders: (i) The debt holders replace the manager and take over the ¯rm in
a strategic default and in any default that resulted from or is accompanied by the current
manager's failure to maintain the ¯rm's assets. The debt holders will forgive the manager
and extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default and in any default that resulted
from the previous manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms' assets; (ii) If the manager has
strategically defaulted in period t or if the manager has defaulted in period t but has failed
to maintain the ¯rms' assets in this period or in the previous period and he has not been
dismissed and/or the ¯rm has not been taken over, then the debtholders will dismiss the
manager and will take over the ¯rm next period regardless of the payment made; (iii) If the
manager was dismissed or if the ¯rm has been taken over in a liquidity default in period t
or in any default that resulted from the previous manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms'
assets, then the debt holders will dismiss the new manager and will take over the ¯rm next
period; (iv) If the debt holders have dismissed the manager and have taken over the ¯rm in
a liquidity default in period t or in any default that resulted from the previous manager's
failure to maintain the ¯rms' assets, then they will replace the manager and will take over
the ¯rm in any strategic default thereafter and will forgive the manager and extend the
maturity of the debt in any liquidity default thereafter; (v) If there is a liquidity default in
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period t or a default that resulted from the previous manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms'
assets and the debt holders forgive but do not extend the maturity of the debt, then the debt
holders will replace the manager and take over the ¯rm in the event of a strategic default
and in any default that resulted from or is accompanied by the current manager's failure to
maintain the ¯rm's assets in any period thereafter and forgive the manager and extend the
maturity of the debt in the event of a liquidity default and in any default that resulted from
the previous manager's failure to maintain the ¯rms' assets in any period thereafter.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) If a (new) manager has paid equilibrium
dividends and maintained the ¯rm's assets each period and has not strategically defaulted
until period t, then he will continue to pay equilibrium dividends, will maintain the ¯rm's
assets and will not strategically default in period t; (b) If there is any deviation by any party
from the equilibrium, then the (new) manager will divert the cash °ows for ever; (c) If the
manager has been replaced immediately following a default in period t and the company has
been taken over by the debt holders, then the new manager will not strategically default in
the following period. 2
Interestingly, the corresponding incentive compatibility conditions for the debtholders
will coincide with those for equity. In particular, (7) and (8) do not have to be satis¯ed for
a large ¯rm to obtain debt ¯nancing. This is so because, given the equilibrium strategies
of the equityholders, the manager can no longer guarantee himself a + ±v when he plans
a strategic default (he knows he will be replaced right after he diverts a). The most the
manager can pocket in a strategic default is v; which is the same that he can guarantee
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himself o®-the-equilibrium-path in an all-equity ¯rm.
Thus, a key implication of Proposition 1 is that a large ¯rm can obtain debt ¯nancing
for the same project that a small ¯rm cannot. Furthermore, the conditions debt holders set
for the debt ¯nancing of a large ¯rm's expansion project are identical to the equity ¯nancing
conditions of a small ¯rm's initial project. This implies that investors in large ¯rms are
indi®erent between debt and equity, even though in small ¯rms they frequently prefer equity
over debt. Thus, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) indi®erence result does hold for large ¯rms
in our model despite the investors' inability to write complete ¯nancial contracts, but it fails
to hold for small ¯rms. The intuition lies in the interaction between the control rights of
subsequent claim holders. Since the control rights of previous security holders represent an
externality for subsequent claim holders, therefore the marginal decision of which security
to issue next becomes irrelevant once a ¯rm has su±cient contractual complexity in place.
It is worth to highlight that the second part of the proposition gives rise to an un-
derinvestment problem that is closely related to Myers's debt overhang problem. In both
scenarios equity holders choose to pass up valuable investment opportunities when all the
bene¯ts would accrue to debt holders. In Myers (1977) the manager (who himself is the
equity holder) decides not to invest because returns from the investment will only bene¯t
the debt holders. In the present model, because the manager would bene¯t from the invest-
ment but cannot commit to periodically renew the assets, some projects will fail to obtain
¯nancing. Equity holders are willing to induce management to properly maintain the new
investment's assets but only if their interest coincides with those of the debt holders. When
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this is not the case, then debt holders will refuse the ¯nancing of project 2.
4.2 The set of equilibrium contracts
In this subsection we show that large ¯rms can also sustain longer-term debt even when
debt holders are given only the right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets. It is particularly
interesting, since these are o®-equilibrium contracts for small ¯rms (Section 3.3). For large
¯rms these contracts further strengthen the M&M indi®erence result.
Suppose that the entrepreneur issues debt with maturity T > 2 by promising investors the
right to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets in default. It follows from our earlier discussion in
Section 3.3 that for the ¯nancing of a small ¯rm investors would refuse to hold this contract.
Since the value of the assets the debt holders can foreclose (i.e. the debt holders' bargaining
position) depends on the manager's decision whether to maintain these assets, the debt
holders can not induce management to periodically renew the ¯rm's assets. Recognizing
this, the manager will always default in period 2 in equilibrium by depleting the ¯rm's assets
and leaving an empty shell. He will take a in the ¯rst period and will divert the second
period cash °ows.
This conclusion, however, does not carry over to large ¯rms. If debt has priority (i.e.
if debt holders have the right to liquidate both project 1's and project 2's assets up to the
value of their claim), then the equity holders of the large ¯rm will take action as soon as
the manager skips the investment. They would act to protect their own investment directly
(project 1's assets) and indirectly by protecting the interest of the debt holders (project 2's
assets). Since their unconditional rights enable the equity holders to take action as soon as
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the manager skips the investment, the manager will be ousted before he is able to deplete the
¯rm's assets. Since the assets are operable, a new manager can be hired to run the company
and the value of the old manager's outside option to restart his old company will diminish.
This implies that a strategic default in the large company will never yield the manager more
than the current cash °ows of the ¯rm. But since (2) and (3) are satis¯ed (by the very fact
that the ¯rm was able to raise outside equity in the ¯rst place), i.e. 8vt = v + x; v ¡ x :
vt ¡ pv+x ¡ a + ± v¡p¡a1¡± ¸ vt; therefore, it is not pro¯table for the manager to strategically
default on the large ¯rm's debt. Proposition 2 summarizes the above.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a ¯rm successfully operates one project and ¯nances it by out-
side equity. Suppose furthermore that the ¯rm seeks to ¯nance its second project by issuing
debt. Then, if the debt holders are granted the right to liquidate both project 1's and project
2's assets in default (up to the value of their claim), then they would be willing to hold debt
whenever c < a and (1), (2) and (3) hold. Alternatively, if the debt holders are granted the
right to liquidate only project 2's assets in default and if the equity holders do not expect any
cash °ows from project 2 (i.e. all cash °ows above the debt payments and depreciation ac-
crue to the manager in equilibrium), then the debt holders will not ¯nance the project unless
condition (9) holds.
The corresponding equilibrium strategies for the equityholders, debtholders and managers
when debt has priority over equity are presented below.
For the equity holders: Equity holders do not replace the manager at ¯rst and until the
manager paid equilibrium dividends and properly maintained the ¯rm's assets each period. If
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there is any deviation from the equilibrium, then the equityholders will replace the manager
next period.
For the debt holders: (i) In case of a default, the debt holders will liquidate the ¯rm's
physical assets (with the most valuable assets ¯rst, up to the value of their claim), if the
manager has not been dismissed in the period following (1) a strategic default; or (2) the
manager's failure to renew any of the ¯rm's physical assets. Otherwise, the debt holders will
forgive the manager and extend the maturity of the debt in default; (ii) If the manager has
not been dismissed in the period following (1) a strategic default; or (2) the manager's failure
to renew any of the ¯rm's physical assets; and the debtholders have not liquidated, then the
debtholders will liquidate the ¯rm's assets next period regardless of the payment made; (iii)
If the ¯rm's assets were partially liquidated in a default in period t and the debtholders still
have outstanding claim, then the debt holders will liquidate the ¯rm's assets next period
regardless of payment made; (iv) If the equilibrium strategy speci¯ed the debt holders to
forgive the manager and to extend the maturity of the debt and the debt holders forgave the
manager, but did not extend the maturity of the debt, then next period onward (i) takes
e®ect.
For the manager and the new manager: (a) If a (new) manager has paid equilibrium
dividends and maintained the ¯rm's assets each period and has not strategically defaulted
until period t, then he will continue to pay equilibrium dividends, will maintain the ¯rm's
assets and will not strategically default in period t; (b) If there is any deviation by any party
from the equilibrium, then the (new) manager will divert the cash °ows for ever; (c) If the
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manager has been replaced in period t but the company's assets have not been liquidated by
the debt holders, then the new manager will not strategically default in the following period.
2
The incentive compatibility conditions associated with the equilibrium strategies are
presented in Appendix A3. As it is shown there, the incentive compatibility conditions of
the debtholders coincide with those of the equityholders in an all-equity ¯rm.
A key implication of Proposition 2 is that even the set of equilibrium contracts di®ers
in di®erent stages of a ¯rm's life cycle: some contracts which are never sustainable as an
initial contract for a small ¯rm become sustainable for large ¯rms. The intuition is again the
stage-dependency of the control rights of subsequent claim holders: in addition to their own
rights, holders of subsequent security issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to
enforce their claims. Whether or not they can do so, depends on the priority structure of
the claims.
Interestingly, however, the reverse of this statement is not true: If a contract can be
sustained for the ¯nancing of a small ¯rm it can always be sustained for the ¯nancing of a
large ¯rm. Furthermore, since it follows from Proposition 2 that the debt ¯nancing conditions
of the large ¯rm are the same as the equity ¯nancing conditions of the small ¯rm (provided
that the debt claim has priority over equity), investors are indi®erent between ¯nancing the
large ¯rm's expansion project with debt or equity. Thus the M&M indi®erence result again
prevails for large ¯rms, even though it fails to hold for small ¯rms.
When debt holders are granted the right to liquidate the assets of both projects, then
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the simplest debt contract that the manager can issue for the ¯nancing of project 2 is a
one-period debt that is periodically rolled over. This contract is not an equilibrium contract
for small ¯rms but it is an equilibrium contract for large ¯rms. Since investors are willing to
hold debt that is periodically rolled over, they are also willing to hold one-period debt even
if (9) is violated. Obviously, the concern for debt overhang places an upper bound on how
much debt can be raised.11
5 Implications for a life-cycle theory of ¯rm ¯nance
Our paper derived di®erent pro¯tability thresholds for the ¯nancing of ¯rms' initial and
subsequent projects. The presence of these di®erent thresholds implies a life-cycle pattern
of ¯rm ¯nancing: ¯rms can issue di®erent securities at di®erent stages of their life-cycles.
11It is worth to mention that in our model asset substitution by managers and equityholders is not a
problem except for ¯rms in distress. To see this, let us extend the model and suppose that the manager has
two investment strategies one which produces higher NPV with lower variance and another which produces
lower NPV and higher variance for the ¯rm. In this model it is an equilibrium strategy for the debt holder to
extend the maturity of the debt in liquidity default if investment 1 is implemented, but dismiss the manager
and take over the ¯rm as a going concern or dismiss the manager and liquidate the assets if investment
2 is implemented. As long as the manager's incentive compatibility conditions hold, the manager would
prefer to stay away from investment 2 (and so would the equity holders). When the managerial incentive
compatibility conditions fail to hold, then the ¯rm can sustain neither debt nor equity and this is when the
manager will switch to investment 2. This occurs only when the ¯rm is in distress. It is straightforward
to see that the above described equilibrium weakly dominates all other equilibria in the sense of Gale and
Hellwig (1985).
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In particular, our theory predicts that there will be ¯rms which issue outside equity, or
convertible debt ¯rst. These ¯rms will then use their retained earnings, and ¯nally will
issue longer-term debt or outside equity to satisfy their subsequent ¯nancing needs. This
prediction is consistent with Kaplan and StrÄomberg (1999) who reports that small ¯rms
typically use ¯nancial contracts which grant investors unconditional rights (private equity)
and very rarely issue securities which are common in large ¯rms (such as standard debt).
Interestingly, the life-cycle pattern of ¯nancing that our theory predicts di®ers from the
one implied by Myers's (1984) pecking order theory of ¯nance in one important aspect: the
initial ¯nancing choice of the ¯rm. Myers predicts that ¯rms will issue debt ¯rst and outside
equity only later, whereas our theory suggests that ¯rms will frequently use outside equity
¯nancing (such as venture capital or private equity) before they use any debt ¯nance.
6 Covenant Debt
In our basic model we focused on the subsequent ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms whose initial
¯nancing is provided by private equity. The model can be extended to incorporate ¯rms with
more complex initial ¯nancing arrangements. One possible extension is to study companies
whose initial ¯nancing is private debt with extensive covenants. While private debt generally
relies on a variety of covenants, the puzzling fact is that most public debt issues lack any
protective covenant in practice (Kahan and Tuckman (1996)).
A direct application of our Proposition 1 would suggest that if public debt holders'
claim is senior to those of private debt holders then the public debt holders can rely on
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their private counterparts to protect their interest, and if it is strictly junior they cannot.
In practice private debt is typically senior to public debt. However, violation of absolute
priority is common in Chapter 11 and private debt restructurings in practice (see John (1993)
for an excellent survey). If future violation of absolute priority is anticipated by private debt
holders, they will be willing to act so as to protect the total value of the debt claims and
thereby the interest of public bondholder. If this is the case, then our model predicts that
bonds would be cheaper to issue in companies that have private debt outstanding than in
those that do not.
7 Dispersed outside equity
Until now we have assumed that the controlling equity holder stays with the ¯rm when
the next stage of ¯nancing approaches. Interestingly, this does not have to be the case.
Even if the controlling equity holder sells his stake to dispersed outside equity the positive
externality that the control rights of junior claim holders represent for senior claim holders,
may still enable the second project to obtain debt ¯nancing.
Evidence shows that even though dispersed outside equity holders have di±culty in coor-
dinating their control challenge against the manager, they do succeed occasionally (Strickland
et al. (1996)). Hence it is plausible to assume that dispersed outside equity can successfully
exercise their control right but only with some probability p. Since their right is uncondi-
tional, they can punish the manager for failing to renew the ¯rm's assets. Taking this into
consideration, the manager who ¯nances his expansion project with debt, cannot guaran-
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tee himself a + ±v from his two-step default strategy (described in Section 3.2), but only
a+ (1¡ p)±v: Thus the presence of dispersed outside equity reduces the expected pro¯t the
manager can make when he defaults. Consequently, it also reduces the incentive payments
the manager has to be paid in equilibrium relative to the case of pure debt ¯nance. This
implies that the presence of dispersed outside equity will induce debt holders to ¯nance
the expansion projects for some large ¯rms even if they would not have ¯nanced the initial
projects of otherwise identical small ¯rms.
This pattern is consistent with Kaplan and StrÄomberg (1999) who predicts that companies
will be under strong investor control at their initial ¯nancing stage and as time goes on the
investor will give up control in the good state but will take control in the bad state. In
our model the ¯rm's initial project is ¯nanced by investors with unconditional rights. If
these investors want to exit, they can do so if the ¯rm is doing well. In this case they can
sell out to dispersed outside equity and the rest of the ¯rm's operation can be ¯nanced by
debt. The resulting ¯nancial structure will leave control with the manager in the good state
and with the investor in the bad state. There is one additional assumption needed however.
For the venture capitalist to exit, it must be the case that the future cash °ows of the
¯rm are substantially higher than the initial investment. Otherwise, the amount dispersed
outside equity (who can enforce less from the manager than private equity) is willing to pay
will not satisfy the venture capitalist. This is a plausible assumption for successful high-tech
companies, whose typical ¯nancing pattern in practice is venture capital ¯rst that is followed
by an IPO (Gompers (1995)). If this assumption does not hold, then in our model the initial
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¯nancier can only sell part of his stake and will keep part of the control.
It is interesting that this extension of the model also provides a rationale for for a ¯rm
to use both debt and (dispersed) outside equity ¯nancing. Outside equity is needed because
debt relies on the positive externality that the control rights of dispersed outside equity
represent and would not be willing to provide ¯nancing in the absence of equity ¯nance.
On the other hand, dispersed outside equity can enforce relatively little from the manager,
therefore, they may not be willing to come up with the investment outlay that is needed
for the expansion project, so some expansion projects with higher outlay will have to be
partially ¯nanced by debt.
This theory also implies that in countries where the legal protection of shareholders is
weak and dispersed investors can enforce very little from managers, companies will have
di±culty to obtain outside equity ¯nancing from small investors (La Porta et al.(1997a,
1997b)). Our model suggests that this constraint will be most binding in the second stage
of ¯nancing. At the initial ¯nancing stage entrepreneurs may obtain ¯nancing from wealthy
individuals in exchange for a large stake in their companies, or by groups or by relatives and
family members. But in countries where shareholders' legal protection is weak, there will be
no way for these ¯nanciers to exit unless another wealthy individual or concentrated owner
is willing to buy their stake in the ¯rm. This implication is consistent with La Porta et al.
(1997a, 1997b) who ¯nd a negative relationship between shareholders' legal protection and
the number of IPOs across countries.
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8 Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic capital structure theory to explain why small ¯rms have
di®erent capital structure from large ¯rms. In a model of optimal ¯nancial contracting we
show that the initial and subsequent ¯nancing decisions of the same ¯rm will lead to di®erent
security choices.
The ¯rm's ¯nancing decisions will di®er in two respect. First, there will be equilibrium
contracts that investors would reject for some small ¯rm, but accept them for an otherwise
identical large ¯rm (i.e. when the two ¯rms have identical projects). Secondly, even the
set of the equilibrium ¯nancial contracts di®ers in di®erent stages of the ¯rm's life cycle:
some contracts which are never sustainable as an initial contract for a small ¯rm become
sustainable for large ¯rms. The reason is the stage-dependency of the control rights of subse-
quent claim holders: the control rights of previous security holders represent an externality
for subsequent claim holders. In addition to their own rights, holders of subsequent security
issues may also rely on the ¯rm's existing investors to enforce their claims. Whether or not
they can do so, depends on the priority structure of the claims. Interestingly, because of this
potential interdependence of the control rights of various claim holders, the marginal deci-
sion of which security to issue next becomes irrelevant once a ¯rm has su±cient contractual
complexity in place.
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Appendix
A1. The remaining incentive compatibility conditions for equity:
Equityholders are better o® repeating the project and replacing the manager following
the manager's failure to pay equilibrium dividends and/or to renew the ¯rm's assets than
repeating the project and keeping the manager, that is,
p^v+x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡
a
±
¸ ¡a
±
; (14)
p^v¡x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡
a
±
¸ ¡a
±
; (15)
p^v+x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ ¡a; (16)
p^v¡x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ ¡a: (17)
Equityholders are better o® repeating the project and replacing the manager following
the manager's failure to pay equilibrium dividends and/or to renew the ¯rm's assets than
abandoning the project, that is,
p^v+x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡
a
±
¸ 0; (18)
p^v¡x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡
a
±
¸ 0; (19)
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p^v+x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ 0; (20)
p^v¡x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¡ a ¸ 0: (21)
Assuming that the new manager pays the same equilibrium dividends as his predecessor
does, condition (1) is su±cient for conditions (14){(21) to hold for every c < a: 2
A2. The remaining incentive compatibility conditions for debt when the debt holders are
granted the right to dismiss management and take over the ¯rm as a going concern in default:
The debt holders are willing to keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt
following a liquidity default rather than dismiss him and extend the maturity of the debt if
8 0 · ¿ < T
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p ¸ ¡c+
T+1X
t=¿+1
±tp^ (22)
The debt holders will keep the manager and extend the maturity of the debt following a
liquidity default rather than dismiss the manager and take over the company if 8 0 · ¿ < T
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p ¸ ¡c+ Ep^
+
1¡ ± : (23)
The debt holders are willing to dismiss the manager, provide I and write a new debt
contract for the renewal of the assets and take equity in exchange for their remaining claim
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following a strategic default at time ¿;12 rather than keep him and re¯nance the project or
keep him and do nothing if 8 0 · ¿ < T
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^+
Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ ¡I; (24)
¡I +
T+¿X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ p^+
Ep^+
1¡ ± ¡ c ¸ 0: (25)
The incoming manager is willing to make payments and to periodically renew the assets
if the debt holders have taken over the company at the time of his arrival and if he has not
strategically defaulted since, if
M^v+x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ v + x (26)
M^v¡x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ v ¡ x (27)
M^v+x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ a+ ±v (28)
M^v¡x + M^
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿ + ±T¡¿+1M^1 ¸ a+ ±v: (29)
12It is su±cient to consider only the two-step default strategy here, since this strategy makes the investors
worst o®.
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Given that the debt holders will dismiss the manager following a strategic default and will
keep dismissing him thereafter, the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each period
following a strategic default since
v + x ¸Mv+x
and
v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
Given that the debt holders will dismiss the manager if the ¯rm has been taken over
following a liquidity default, the manager will divert the cash °ows next period since
v + x ¸Mv+x
and
v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
Given that investors will dismiss the new manager if the ¯rm has not been taken over
following a default, the new manager will divert the cash °ows next period
v + x ¸ M^v+x
and
v ¡ x ¸ M^v¡x:
2
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A3. Incentive compatibility conditions for the equilibrium strategies associated with Proposi-
tion 2:
The equity holders are willing to provide the ¯nancing of project 1 if (1) holds.
The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
pay equilibrium dividends and/or to renew project 1's assets if (14){(21) hold.
The equityholders are willing to dismiss the manager following the manager's failure to
renew project 2's assets, since
p^v+x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¸ 0; (30)
p^v¡x ¡ c+ ±p^1¡ ± ¸ 0: (31)
The debt holders are willing to provide ¯nancing for project 2 if (1) holds.
The debt holders are willing to extend the maturity of the debt in a liquidity default, or
in any default that resulted from the previous manager's failure to renew the ¯rm's assets
and/or taking the cash °ows rather than liquidate the ¯rm's assets, since
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p ¸ minf
T+1X
t=¿+1
±t¡¿p;L g (32)
where L = L1; L2; L2 + a:
In case of a default, the debt holders are willing to liquidate the ¯rm's physical assets
(with the most valuable assets ¯rst, up to the value of their claim) if the manager has not
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been dismissed in the period following (1) a strategic default; or (2) the manager's failure to
renew any of the ¯rm's physical assets, since L ¸ 0:
The manager is willing to comply with the debt -and equity holders if
Mv+x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v + x; (33)
and
Mv¡x +M
TX
t=¿+1
±t¡¿+1 + ±T+1¡¿M1 ¸ v ¡ x: (34)
Given that the debt holders will dismiss the manager following a strategic default and
will keep dismissing him thereafter, the manager will keep diverting the cash °ows each
period following a strategic default or the manager's failure to renew the ¯rm's assets, since
v + x ¸Mv+x and v ¡ x ¸Mv¡x:
It is straightforward to see that c < a and (1), (2) and (3) are su±cient for the rest of
the conditions to hold.2
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